Abstract With over 17 emissions trading systems (ETSs) now in place across four continents, interest in linking ETSs is growing. Linking ETSs offers economic, political, and administrative benefits. It also faces major challenges. Linking can affect overall ambition, financial flows, and the location and nature of investments, reduces regulatory autonomy, and requires harmonization of ETS design elements. This article examines three options that could help overcome challenges by restricting the flow of units among jurisdictions through quotas, exchange rates, or discount rates. We use a simple model and three criteria-abatement outcome, economic implications, and feasibility-to assess these 'restricted linking' options. Quotas can enhance cost-effectiveness relative to no linking and allow policy-makers to retain control on the extent of unit flows. Exchange rates can create abatement and economic benefits or unintended adverse implications for cost-effectiveness and total abatement, depending on how rates are set. Due to information asymmetries between the regulated entities and policy-makers setting the exchange rate, as well as uncertainties about future developments, setting exchange rates in a manner that avoids such unintended consequences could prove difficult. Discount rates, in contrast, can ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total abatement are enhanced. Overall, restricted linking options do not achieve the benefits of full linking, but also avoid some major pitfalls, as well as offering levers that can be adjusted, should linking concerns prove to be more significant than anticipated.
Introduction
Emissions trading systems (ETSs) are a widely used policy tool to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As of February 2016, 17 distinct ETSs operated across four continents, with another 15 in preparation or under consideration (ICAP 2016) . The emergence of these new systems, the adoption of the Paris Agreement with provisions enabling international transfers of units, and recognition of the challenges of building a global carbon market have led to renewed interest in options for linking ETSs.
Linking ETSs can yield multiple benefits, such as leading to lower overall abatement costs, but can also face considerable challenges, in particular if the ambition and design of ETSs differ (Flachsland et al. 2009b; Burtraw et al. 2013; Bodansky et al. 2015; Ranson and Stavins 2016) . These challenges have raised interest in restricted forms of linking, which involves the partial, conditional, or restricted recognition of units from another ETS (Burtraw et al. 2013; Marcu 2015; Fuessler et al. 2016; Mehling and Görlach 2016) .
This article explores benefits of, and challenges for, options for restricted linking of ETSs. We assess three restricted linking options: quotas, which restrict the amount or type of units from other jurisdictions that can be used for compliance; exchange rates, which adjust the value of units transferred between jurisdictions by a conversion factor; and discount rates, which also involve a conversion factor, but placing a greater value on units of the own jurisdiction. We use a simple representation of two ETSs in two jurisdictions with linear marginal abatement cost curves to compare these options with regard to three broad criteria: GHG abatement outcome; economic implications, including cost-effectiveness, abatement costs, distributional impacts, and unit liquidity and fungibility; and feasibility, including implementation challenges arising from setting the quota, exchange rate, or discount rate, and how the restricted linking options affect the regulatory autonomy of a jurisdiction's decision-maker. Our comparison of these options against criteria, while not a fully comprehensive analysis, provides important insights into the potential consequences of restricted linking that are particularly timely given increased interest in alternatives to full linking of ETSs.
We begin by introducing the context for linking ETSs and the rationale for considering restricted forms of linking, along with describing the three restricted linking options (Sect. 2). We then introduce the methods and criteria used to assess these options (Sect. 3). We assess the options by comparing them to the situation of full linking and no linking (Sect. 4), discuss our findings (Sect. 5), and provide conclusions (Sect. 6).
Context and overview of restricted linking of ETSs
Linking of ETSs generally means that one ETS accepts a unit that is also used by another ETS as a compliance instrument. The linking of ETSs can take different forms, with three main dimensions (Mehling and Görlach 2016) :
• Bilateral/multilateral: Bilateral linking involves two ETS, whereas multilateral linking involves multiple ETSs.
• Direct/indirect: Direct linking implies that one ETS accepts a unit issued by another ETS, whereas indirect linking refers to the situation in which two ETSs both recognize a unit from a third system. For example, both the EU ETS and the New Zealand ETS initially allowed the use of Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint Implementation (JI).
• Full/restricted: Full linking involves the unconditional mutual recognition of units without any quantitative or qualitative restrictions, whereas restricted linking involves the partial, conditional, or restricted recognition of units from another ETS (see below).
Full linking of ETSs can yield multiple benefits, including lower overall abatement costs, enhanced market liquidity, reduced price volatility, a potential reduction in carbon leakage risks, and reduced transaction costs. By lowering overall costs, linking can generate domestic support and encourage jurisdictions to adopt more ambitious targets (Flachsland et al. 2009b; Burtraw et al. 2013; Kachi et al. 2015; Bodansky et al. 2015; Ranson and Stavins 2016) .
Full linking of ETSs also faces considerable challenges, some of which policy-makers may address by exploring restricted linking of ETSs. Full linking may pose challenges if key ETS design elements-such as the allocation of allowances; measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards; cost containment measures (price floors or ceilings); offsets rules and limits-differ between ETSs based on the political and economic context. Further challenges to full linking include: assessing and comparing the ambition of the ETS caps set by the jurisdictions; the potential for a sense of reduced ambition if linking to an ETS that is viewed as less stringent; real or perceived loss of regulatory autonomy; unequal capacities among jurisdictions; and potentially competing domestic policy objectives (Sterk et al. 2006; Tuerk et al. 2009; Sterk and Schüle 2009; Burtraw et al. 2013; Green et al. 2014; Haites 2014; Kachi et al. 2015; Bodansky et al. 2015; Ranson and Stavins 2016) .
To the extent that designs and ambition differ among jurisdictions, linking will alter carbon prices and the location and extent to which long-term investment in low-carbon technologies and any associated co-benefits occur (Flachsland et al. 2009a; Bodansky et al. 2015) . While in principle these shifts-from higher-to lower-cost emission reduction opportunities-will improve overall economic efficiency, it may be difficult for policymakers to justify these shifts to constituencies that may see reduced investment and cobenefits or face higher allowance prices. Furthermore, linking creates financial transfers across jurisdictions, which can be particularly challenging if the direction of flow is from smaller or less affluent jurisdictions towards larger or more affluent ones. Jurisdictions that see a decline (increase) in allowance prices from linking will also see a reduction (increase) in investment in abatement activities, a decrease (increase) in allowance auction revenues, and a net flow of resources to (from) other jurisdictions. Doda and Taschini (2016) suggest that the difference in (emissions) size as well as the existence of unilateral tax distortions (e.g. a tax on allowance transactions) may affect otherwise mutually advantageous linking arrangements. To the extent that allowances are auctioned, full linking could reduce overall auction revenues across the jurisdictions. Where auction proceeds are already earmarked for specific uses (e.g. tax rebates or investments), the decline, if significant, could create a political barrier to linking. In addition, linking may create political uncertainty, as another jurisdiction's future withdrawal could undermine the system. Some even argue that linking can create a potential disincentive to maintaining or increasing ambition in an individual jurisdiction (Helm 2003) . Given the mix of benefits, obstacles, and risks, successful linking requires carefully matching jurisdictions with compatible ETS designs and domestic policy objectives (Comendant and Taschini 2014) , and 'navigating tradeoffs between efficiency and political feasibility' (Green et al. 2014 (Green et al. , p. 1066 .
The challenges to full linking have increased interest in options for restricted linking that jurisdictions could pursue to capture some of the political, economic, and environmental benefits associated with linking. Restricted linking enables the flow of units among jurisdictions, but with specific constraints to help address concerns that linkage of not fully harmonized ETSs might create. While these options have been discussed in many venues, they have yet to be examined thoroughly in the literature. This article aims to help fill that gap by exploring the potential advantages and drawbacks of different restricted linking options. We examine three restricted linking options:
1. Quotas, also referred to as quantity limits, restrict the amount of (specific types of) units from other jurisdictions that can be used for compliance. Quotas can be formulated and implemented in different ways. They would be typically designed to limit overall net imports rather than exports and could be expressed as a fraction of total compliance obligations that an entity can surrender. 1 2. Exchange rates, also referred to as trading ratios, imply that units from one jurisdiction can be used for compliance in another, but their value is adjusted by a conversion factor. Exchange rates operate in a symmetrical fashion. If an exchange rate is set such that two units from jurisdiction A could be used in place of one unit in jurisdiction B, then in jurisdiction A, one jurisdiction B unit would be worth twojurisdiction A units. This symmetry creates fungibility and enables units to flow readily back and forth among the jurisdictions. 3. Discount rates could be regarded as a variation on exchange rates. They also involve a conversion factor, but such that more than one unit from another jurisdiction is required to meet a compliance obligation in the own jurisdiction, thereby placing a greater value on units of the own jurisdiction. While exchange rates inherently require a symmetrical relationship in the value of jurisdictions' allowances, discount rates do not. Jurisdictions could apply one discount rate in one direction of allowance flow (e.g. 3:1 from system A to system B) and parity (1:1) or a rate of different magnitude in the other direction (e.g. 2:1 from system B to system A).
These options are not mutually exclusive, but could be combined, for example, by applying both quotas and discount rates to units from another ETS. Some of these options have already been implemented in ETSs, and others are still being explored by policymakers and researchers. Quotas have been applied by most ETSs with regard to offsets, usually with the intent of ensuring that a certain fraction of the emission reductions be achieved domestically by the entities regulated by the ETS.
Perhaps most examined through the World Bank's Globally Networked Carbon Markets initiative, 2 the concept of exchange rates has received limited attention in the carbon market literature (Marcu 2015; Fuessler et al. 2016) . Burtraw et al. (2013) examine the implications of linking the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and California ETS with an exchange rate where three RGGI units are equivalent to one California unit. Other research on trading ratios mainly focused on non-uniformly mixed pollutants, such as sulphur or nitrogen oxides, where the ultimate damage is strongly affected by the location of emission (Mendelsohn 1986 ). There, the case for trading ratios is clearer; in an ETS for local or regional air pollutants, a trading ratio can make a ton of emission reduction in a more populated air shed more valuable than one in a remote area, increasing both health benefits and economic efficiency. For carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and most GHGs; however, damage is largely unaffected by the location of emission. The nature and rationale for exchange rates for GHG emissions have more to do with expanding markets, improving liquidity, and enabling links that might not otherwise be feasible.
Discount rates were proposed in the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, commonly referred to as the Waxman-Markey bill, which stated that an entity would need to turn in 1.25 tons of offsets for a compliance obligation of one ton, implementing effectively a 20% discount rate. Similarly, France introduced a general 10% discount on domestic JI projects, implying that only 90% of the emission reductions be issued as ERUs. Existing research has focused on discount rates in the context of offset mechanisms (Bakker et al. 2011; Chung 2007; Erickson et al. 2014; Schneider 2009; Warnecke et al. 2014) .
There are also situations where jurisdictions merge or join existing ETSs, and operate with the same, common rules and units. Examples include Norway joining the EU ETS, or Northeastern US States collaborating together to form the RGGI. We consider these situations to be distinct from linking, where the individual systems remain distinct in rules, units, and administration, and thus do not examine them further here. Policy-makers can also pursue an incremental alignment of ETS, programme elements, such as coverage, allocation rules, or monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) standards, but stopping short of mutual unit recognition. This has also been referred to as 'linking by degrees' (Burtraw et al. 2013 ).
Methods
We assess the three restricted linking options by comparing them with the situations of no linking and full linking. We use three broad criteria to evaluate the merits and drawbacks of each option:
1. GHG abatement outcome: We assess the GHG abatement across and within individual jurisdictions, given existing emissions caps. We do not consider impacts on environmental co-benefits, since these are highly specific to the jurisdictions' context. We also do not consider how an option could encourage or discourage deeper reduction targets in future periods, an implication that is more difficult to assess without significant speculation. 2. Economic implications: We assess the cost implications, including cost-effectiveness, total abatement costs across and within individual jurisdictions and distributional impacts, and implications for unit liquidity and fungibility. For a given abatement outcome, we define cost-effectiveness as the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions with no linking divided by the total abatement costs in both jurisdictions with restricted (or full) linking. In cases where a restricted linking option changes the overall abatement outcome, we use this changed abatement level in comparing the costs with no linking; to this end, we assume that the abatement under no linking would change in each jurisdiction proportionally to their emission reduction targets. Market liquidity refers to the ability to purchase or sell units without causing drastic
Restricted linking of emissions trading systems: options… 887 changes in their price. We assume that liquidity increases with the number of actors in the market for the commodity. We consider two units as fungible if they can be mutually substituted in place of one another when surrendering them for compliance. We do not assess potential macroeconomic impacts, such as effects on employment, economic growth, or changes in environmental co-benefits, since they strongly depend on the specific context of the jurisdictions and the nature of abatement options pursued or not pursued as the result of linkage. We also do not assess the impacts on price volatility and the risk of carbon leakage-i.e. the risk of production shifts between jurisdictions as a result of carbon markets affecting competitiveness-which depend on several context-specific factors, including how allowances are allocated to entities, whether allowance prices are reflected in the cost of products, and the extent to which barriers may limit the trade of products among jurisdictions. 3. Feasibility: The feasibility of restricted linking options depends on many aspects. We explore two aspects that appear particularly important and can be assessed without the specific context of the jurisdictions: implementation challenges arising from setting the quota, the exchange rate or the discount rate, and how the restricted linking options affect the regulatory autonomy of a jurisdiction's decision-makers. We do not assess other aspects, such as how economic and environmental outcomes are perceived by influential actors, or the impact of linking on a jurisdiction's emissions goals, investment in low-carbon technologies, abatement costs for covered entities, or consumer costs, and how such impacts are assessed and communicated. These aspects often depend on the specific political and economic context of the jurisdictions.
We use a simple representation of two ETSs in two jurisdictions to assess the abatement outcome and economic implications of the restricted trading options. In our model, we define each jurisdiction by: (1) the total abatement under no linking, reflected by the difference between its emission cap and business-as-usual (BAU) emissions and (2) a simplified, linear marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve that represents how its cost of reducing emissions increases with the level of abatement. We apply this model, first for reference, to the cases of no linking and full linking and then to quotas, exchange rates, and discount rates. We assume that the two ETSs have a long-term target path below BAU emissions, i.e. with no overallocation of allowances, and allow for banking of allowances, providing entities with a certain long-term emissions budget, and that the two ETSs do not have any price containment mechanisms, such as offsets, reserves, floors, caps, and/or triggers. It is important to note the limitations of these assumptions, the criteria, and the simplified model, which are further discussed in Sect. 5. For the purpose of illustrating the results in charts, we set the parameters of the model such that, in the absence of any linking, one jurisdiction has an allowance price (per ton of CO 2 ) three times higher than the other, similar to the parameterization used by Burtraw et al. (2013) . We refer alternately here to the 'lower-price' jurisdiction (or jurisdiction A) and the 'higher-price' jurisdiction (or jurisdiction B). The simplified model and its application are further described in the supplementary information to this article.
Assessment of restricted linking options 4.1 The reference cases: no linking and full linking
The cases of no linking and full linking of ETSs create helpful reference scenarios for examining restricted linking options. In the absence of linking, differing emission caps and marginal abatement lead to different allowance prices among systems. If systems are fully linked, their allowance prices converge, and abatement activity would shift from the higher-price jurisdiction (B) towards the lower-price jurisdiction (A). Figure 1 depicts this dynamic. It shows the contribution of each jurisdiction to total emission reductions or abatement (the width of the x-axis). Assuming no linking, abatement activity in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) moves from left to right along an abatement cost curve (red line) until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width of the red dotted line). Similarly, abatement activity in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) moves along its abatement cost curve (blue line), but flipped, starting from the right side of the chart until its targeted emission reductions are achieved (width of the blue dotted line). The width of the x-axis corresponds to the total emission reductions in both jurisdictions, with the dotted red and blue lines indicating the reductions in each jurisdiction under no linking. The resulting allowances prices in the two systems (p A,0 and p B,0 ) differ, as shown.
If these systems are fully linked, the allowance prices in the two systems converge at a common price (p E ). Entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) abate more emissions, while entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) abate less. A respective amount of units is transferred from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B) (green dotted line), with a net financial transfer from the higher-price to the lower-price jurisdiction (the amount of units transferred, shown by the green dotted arrow, times the linkedsystem allowance price).
Full linking leads to several economic benefits. The primary beneficiaries of the economic surplus from linking are the entities covered by the ETSs. Total costs to achieve the overall abatement outcome are reduced, and these benefits from increased cost-effectiveness are shared among the two jurisdictions. While there is greater abatement in the lowerprice jurisdiction (A), the financial transfer (by entities) from the higher-price jurisdiction (B) in acquiring allowances exceeds the cost of the added abatement, providing an economic surplus, as shown by the red shaded area in Fig. 1 . For the higher-price jurisdiction (B), overall costs decrease because the reduction in abatement costs exceeds the transfer payment made to the lower-price jurisdiction (A), creating the economic surplus shown by the blue shaded area. Furthermore, full linking enhances market liquidity by increasing the number of allowances and actors across the linked market, creating an added economic benefit. The units from the two jurisdictions are fully fungible. However, full linking requires considerable effort to harmonize and therefore also reduces the regulatory autonomy of the decision-makers (see Sect. 2).
Quotas
Quotas will only have implications if they effectively limit the transfer of allowances. This holds if the quota is set lower than the net allowance flow under full linking. Figure 2 illustrates the implications of a quota that enables 50% of the unit transfer that would occur with full linking (orange lines). The quota does not affect the overall level of abatement across jurisdictions, but affects the level of abatement in each jurisdiction. As under full linking, abatement increases in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) and decreases in the higherprice jurisdiction (B), but to a lesser extent than under full linking. The amount of allowances transferred (green line) corresponds to the quota limit.
The economic implications of a quota will tend to lie between those of no linking and full linking. As Fig. 2 shows, economic gains (shaded area) per net unit transferred among jurisdictions decrease as one moves from no linking (where the price disparities are highest) towards full linking (where price disparities disappear). For example, with linear MAC curves, as shown in Fig. 2 , a 50% quota yields 75% of the cost-effectiveness gains from full linking. Quotas imply that different prices persist in the two jurisdictions, though with a smaller difference (p A,Q , p B,Q ).
Another interesting implication is how the relative economic gains for the two jurisdictions could differ from those under full linking. With quotas, the economic benefit shown by the hatched rectangle in Fig. 2 could in principle accrue to either jurisdiction A Fig. 2 Implications of a quota set at 50% of the net allowance transfers under full linking (simplified model) or B, depending on how the quota is implemented. If the quota is expressed as a percentage of the compliance obligations by entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B), it would limit the demand for allowance transfers from the lower-price jurisdiction (A). As the entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) would compete to sell allowances to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), the price for such transfers would likely settle at the allowance price in the lower-price jurisdiction (p A,Q ), and the economic benefit shown by the hatched area in Fig. 2 would confer to the entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B).
However, a quota could also be set on the supply side, as an export quota. To implement an export quota, the lower-price jurisdiction (A) could limit the number of allowances that can be used by other jurisdictions (e.g. B), for example, through auction licenses or permits that entities from other jurisdictions would need to hold and surrender when using its allowances outside the jurisdiction. Entities in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) would then compete for the rights to use a limited amount of allowances from the lower-price jurisdiction (A), and the price for using transferred allowances would likely settle at the allowance price in the higher-price jurisdiction (p B,Q ). In other words, the lower-price jurisdiction (A) would capture the scarcity rent (hatched area in Fig. 2 ). In conclusion, quotas that limit supply will create greater economic benefits for the exporting, lower-price jurisdiction (A), while quotas that limit demand (or use) will create greater economic benefits for the importing, higher-price jurisdiction (B).
Relative to no linking, quotas will increase market liquidity as they will increase the number of potential buyers and holders of units. Without full linking, however, jurisdiction A and jurisdiction B allowances would not be fully fungible and would therefore continue to be traded as different commodities at commodity exchanges.
Deciding how and where to set the quota level presents a significant implementation challenge. Economic modelling could help policy-makers understand the implications of different quota levels, based on estimated marginal abatement potentials and costs, relative to a projection of BAU emissions. But history has shown that abatement potentials, abatement costs, and emissions trajectories can often diverge significantly from prior expectations. To respond to such unexpected developments, policy-makers could adjust the quota level over time. However, unless adjustments are predictable, they could undermine investment certainty. Furthermore, if one jurisdiction wishes to adjust a quota, it may require negotiation and agreement with policy-makers in other linked jurisdictions. Such a requirement may be laid down in a linking agreement, but it could also be made subject to a simplified amendment procedure (cf. Mehling and Haites 2009) . One option to avoid potentially difficult negotiations on quota adjustments could be agreeing ex ante on an automatic adjustment, triggered, for example, by observed allowance prices. If allowance prices were to exceed a threshold over a defined time period, an import quota could be increased, and conversely, it could be adjusted downwards if prices were to fall below a floor.
An important feature of quotas is that, compared to full linking, they enable policymakers to retain a certain level of control on the extent of unit flows and related impacts.
Exchange rates
The implications of exchange rates are more complex than those of quotas. First, in contrast to full linking or quotas, exchange rates can affect the total abatement across the two jurisdictions. Second, the abatement outcome and economic implications are highly sensitive to the value at which the exchange rate is set. Figure 3 illustrates the implications of different exchange rate values for two key parameters-total abatement and cost-effectiveness-using the model and parameters described in Sect. 2. For ease of comparison, the figure also illustrates the outcome for full linking, no linking, and quotas. The black line reflects different exchange rate levels (R) that increase clockwise on the curve. For the purpose of this analysis, we define the exchange rate as the number of units from the jurisdiction with the expected lower-price absent linking (A) that are needed for compliance in the jurisdiction with the expected higher-price absent linking (B).
The implications differ for three ranges of possible values:
• 'Effective' exchange rates: We define effective exchange rates, found in the upper right quadrant in Fig. 3 , as rates at which both total abatement and cost-effectiveness are higher than with no linking. Exchange rates are effective if set above 1 (which corresponds to full linking, the upper grey dot in Fig. 3 ), but lower than the ratio of allowance prices under no linking (1 \ R \ p B,0 / p A,0 ). The net flow of allowances is from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), and as a result fewer emissions are allowed in the higher-price jurisdiction (B) for every allowance from the lower-price jurisdiction (A). As exchange rates move from the no linking value to the full linking value (parity), the flow of allowances from A to B increases, while the net emissions benefit per unit transferred decreases, leading to the behaviour shown in Fig. 3 , where the overall abatement outcome reaches a maximum at a middlerange rate.
• 'Reversed' exchange rates: We define reversed exchange rates, found in the upper left quadrant in Fig. 3 , as below 1 (R \ 1). We refer to them as reversed exchange rates because they reverse in which jurisdiction allowances are valued higher: while units still flow from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) to the higher-price jurisdiction (B), their value is effectively 'inflated': less than one allowance from the lower-price jurisdiction (A) is required to emit one more ton in the higher-price jurisdiction (B). Abatement Fig. 3 Implications of varying exchange rates on total abatement and cost-effectiveness (simplified model) decreases in each jurisdiction relative to full linking, and as a result total abatement declines relative to both full linking and no linking. Cost-effectiveness decreases relative to full linking as well, though it remains above the no linking level until exchange rates reach low levels (not shown in Fig. 3 ).
• 'Overstated' exchange rates: We define overstated exchange rates, found in the lower left quadrant in Fig. 3 , as rates set above the ratio of allowance prices under no linking (R [ p B,0 / p A,0 ). We refer to them as overstated because they exaggerate the expected price difference between both jurisdictions with no linking. Remarkably, they reduce both total abatement and cost-effectiveness relative to no linking. In other words, overstated exchange rates lead to worse outcomes than no linking. Under overstated exchange rates, the direction of allowance flows and transfer payment reverses, with entities in the lower-price jurisdiction (A) buying allowances from the higher-price jurisdiction (B). As a consequence, less abatement occurs in the jurisdiction with the lower-cost abatement opportunities (A), while more abatement occurs in the jurisdiction with higher-cost abatement opportunities (B), decreasing the costeffectiveness. While not calling them overstated exchange rates, Burtraw et al. (2013) discuss such rates in the context of linking California-Québec and RGGI.
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In all three cases, assuming no constraints on allowance flow or use, the exchange rate will determine the ratio of allowance prices: the price in jurisdiction B is always R times higher than the one in jurisdiction A. In comparison with quotas, exchanges rates allow the two jurisdictions' allowances to be fully fungible and offer the same liquidity as full linking.
Exchange rates could be set at different values depending on which policy objectives are pursued. If the primary policy objective is enhancing market liquidity while avoiding any other impacts, one could argue that an exchange rate set at the ratio of the allowance prices under no linking (R = p B,0 / p A,0 ) would best fit that purpose. If a key policy objective is enhancing cost-effectiveness, values closer to 1 may provide more benefits. If policy-makers intend to ensure that total abatement is increased rather than decreased, moderate exchange rates, set between 1 and the ratio of allowance prices under no linking, would best ensure that this policy objective is met (aside, of course, from tightening the cap). Hence, approaching the 'best' exchange rates may require balancing different policy objectives. That said, for a broad range of policy objectives, policy-makers will likely want to set the exchange rate within the spectrum of effective exchange rates, rather than overstated or reversed exchange rates, which lead to several adverse impacts.
In practice, setting exchange rates poses several challenges. Ensuring that the exchange rate is set and remains within the effective range is difficult. Doing so requires that those who set exchange rates have good information, as well as foresight, for each jurisdiction, on BAU emissions and on the abatement potential and costs. Yet, BAU emissions and abatement potential and costs may face major uncertainties. Furthermore, there may be information asymmetries between regulators and the regulated entities with respect to abatement opportunities and costs. Because of these uncertainties and information asymmetries, a regulator might set an exchange rate ex ante that, based on best available information at the time, appears to be in the effective range, but turns out to be a reversed or overstated exchange rate.
Regulators could aim to adjust exchange rates to mitigate these risks. However, in practice, this too could be challenging. Once systems are linked through an exchange rate, only a single allowance price will remain. It then becomes impossible to observe, and difficult to impute from modelling or other data, what the relative allowances prices in different jurisdictions would have been were the systems not linked, the ratio of which is essential for understanding whether an exchange rate is effective, overstated, or reversed. And lastly, negotiating exchange rate values, including the basis for any adjustments over time, with other jurisdictions-or entrusting this process to a third party-could also be very challenging. Exchange rates could be viewed as valuing a jurisdiction's climate mitigation actions; this perception could make negotiations on exchange rates politically sensitive. The World Bank's Globally Networked Carbon Markets Initiative suggested that financial markets themselves could set exchange rates, and they could indeed 'float', as they do for currencies and other financial products. However, it remains unclear how this would work in practice. Unlike other products and services and the currencies used for their exchange, emissions allowances have no value outside the markets created by the regulators themselves.
Exchange rates also do not provide advantages with regard to the regulatory autonomy of decision-makers. Once exchange rates have been set, decision-makers cannot influence allowance, investment, and financial flows.
Discount rates
Discount rates can be regarded as a variation on exchange rates, with a view to addressing some of the challenges inherent to exchange rates. In contrast to exchange rates, they do not need to be set in a symmetrical fashion, which allows establishing discount rates in ways that ensure that rates are always effective, and neither reversed nor overstated. If policy-makers want to ensure that a discount rate always 'lands' in the effective rangeeven under information asymmetry and uncertainty with regard to BAU emissions, abatement potential, and abatement costs-they could implement it in either of the following ways:
1. One-way discount rates: One jurisdiction allows imports of allowances from another jurisdiction, converted at a discount rate above 1, i.e. more than one allowance from the other jurisdiction is required to emit one more ton in the importing jurisdiction. No allowance exports would be allowed to the other jurisdiction. 2. Two-way discount rates: Both jurisdictions allow importing units, each using a discount rate that is above 1. In both directions of allowance flows, more than one imported allowance would be required to emit one more ton in the importing jurisdiction.
The abatement outcome and economic implications are similar to those of effective exchange rates. The two approaches would guarantee that both total abatement and costeffectiveness could only increase as a result of allowance trade among jurisdictions. However, with discount rates, allowances are only transferred between jurisdictions if the difference in allowance prices without linking exceeds the discount rate. For example, if both jurisdictions applied a 20% discount to allowances imported from the other jurisdiction (1.25 imported allowances required per ton emitted), trade would only start if the price difference between the jurisdictions (with no linking) is larger than this differential. If the price difference is smaller, the outcome would be the same as for no linking. In other words, the price difference between the two jurisdictions is capped to a maximum of 20%.
In this regard, discount rates can work in a similar manner as price containment mechanisms, unless prices rise simultaneously in both systems. Moreover, unlike exchange rates, discount rates do not provide for fungibility of allowances, and hence, like quotas or oneway linking, they also fail to provide for significantly enhanced market liquidity.
Setting the level of discount rates, and possibly updating them, is an important challenge, similar to quotas as discussed above, but less so than for exchange rates, since they can be set up in ways that avoid unintended consequences. Applying discount rates reciprocally (both jurisdictions discount unit imports at the same rate) might address perceptions about valuing reductions differently across jurisdictions. Compared to exchange rates, discount rates could be more easily adjusted over time and would allow regulators to retain more decision-making autonomy compared to full linking.
Discussion
Our assessment of restricted linking options shows that the abatement outcome, the economic implications, and the feasibility differ considerably between the three options. Table 1 compares the three restricted linking options against the main criteria.
The most appropriate option for restricted linking depends on the specific policy objectives pursued. If the ultimate goal of policy-makers is indeed full linking, and restricted linkage is viewed as a step towards that end, then quotas may be an attractive option. In contrast to exchange rates, they cannot undermine cost-effectiveness and overall abatement and do not create different perceptions of the relative value and implied ambition of each ETS that could ultimately hamper efforts to reach agreement on full linking.
If the main policy goal is increasing liquidity, exchange rates could be considered. However, information asymmetries and uncertainties in setting the rate could seriously undermine the intended policy objectives. In this regard, one could question whether exchange rates would not mainly add another layer of complexity when negotiating a linking agreement, while not necessarily addressing the concerns with full linking. Our findings on exchange rates are similar to those of Burtraw et al. (2013) , who evaluated an exchange rate of 3 between California-Québec and RGGI. Under current allowance prices, this exchange rate would fall in the overstated range.
By contrast, discount rates can avoid some of the challenges of exchange rates. Discount rates could be set up in ways that ensure that both cost-effectiveness and total emissions abatement are enhanced. They implicitly link flexibility and mitigation ambition-the more the regulated entities use the flexibility to import units from another jurisdiction, the more emissions are reduced. Applying discount rates reciprocally (both jurisdictions discount unit imports at the same rate) might address perceptions about valuing reductions differently across jurisdictions.
Our analysis builds on a simplified model and several assumptions. The direction of the implications can be generalized to other two-jurisdiction relationships, where marginal abatement costs increase in a roughly linear fashion, entities can bank allowances and have certainty on a long-term target trajectory below BAU levels, and price containment mechanisms are not in place. Different parametrizations of the linear MAC curves lead to similar outcomes.
In practice, many ETSs have features and circumstances which are not considered in this article, including price containment mechanisms, offset use, targets above BAU, political uncertainty on the ambition of future targets, more complex abatement cost functions, and transaction costs. Moreover, linking the ETSs of more than two jurisdictions would add further complexity (Mehling and Görlach 2016) . Price containment measures create well-recognized challenges to linking (Harrison et al. 2006) . If two ETSs have a price floor, full linking will generally, but not always, impose the higher-price floor on both schemes. If only one of the two ETSs has a price floor, it will become applicable in both schemes and could increase the total abatement outcome from both ETSs (Burtraw et al. 2013) . Linking can also change the amount and type of offsets used and thus the total abatement, depending on the extent of over-or under-crediting by different offset types (Erickson et al. 2014) . If one system is over-allocated and the other not, then (restricted) linking them could reduce overall emissions abatement. Under uncertainty on the future target trajectory, entities may prioritize short-term over long-term abatement options, and (restricted) linking could lead to less cost-effective outcomes in a long-term perspective. Linking, whether full or restricted, could also have impacts on the ambition of the future target periods. If restrictions allow less harmonized systems to link, they could also reduce incentives to harmonize and move towards full linking. Finally, (restricted) linking two ETSs involves transaction costs which could outweigh the benefits for one or both of the linking partners (Flachsland et al. 2009a) .
Assessing these features and circumstances in the context of restricted linking requires considering the context of specific ETSs and is beyond the scope of this article and subject to further research. Fully understanding the implications of restricted linking will require assessing other environmental, economic and political implications, such as on environmental co-benefits, price volatility, and risks of carbon leakage. Generally, the implications and feasibility of linking-whether full or restricted-will depend heavily on the design of the ETSs (e.g. allocation rules, price containment measures), the ambition of the caps (e.g. over-allocation or accumulated surpluses, political certainty), the size of the ETSs (e.g. if one ETS is much smaller than the other), the marginal abatement cost curves, and the use of price containment mechanisms. The present analysis provides only a partial picture of the various aspects that play a role when considering (restricted) linking of ETSs. It is therefore important for researchers and policy-makers to carefully consider and assess the implications of (restricted) linking in their specific context. 
Conclusions
While restricted linking options do not, in principle, achieve the potential benefits of full linking, they can lessen some of the potential pitfalls. They can increase cost-effectiveness while maintaining more regulatory autonomy for decision-makers. They also offer easier off-ramps to terminate linking arrangements 4 and levers to adjust (e.g. quota levels or discount rates), should linking concerns prove to be more significant than anticipated. Restricted linking options may thus represent a cautious approach that can be more easily implemented and explored where full linking is either infeasible in the near term or incompatible with the objectives of the jurisdictions involved. Borrowing the 'matchmaking' analogy that Comendant and Taschini (2014) invoke for the process of finding the right 'linking partner', restricted linking is akin to moving in together, either before (or with no intention of) getting married.
Our analysis shows that restricted linking could have unintended adverse outcomes. Careful consideration of the specific ETS design and context of the prospective linking partners is key to avoid such consequences. The most suitable option for restricted linking also depends on the policy objectives pursued. Quotas and discount rates, or their combination, could provide benefits compared to no linking, whereas exchange rates could lead to unintended adverse environmental and economic consequences. Discount rates are a promising option if the main policy objective is increasing cost-efficiency, flexibility and total abatement outcome, while maintaining regulatory autonomy.
